Data protection and the DPDP Act
Who is responsible for a recipient's personal data, what we do with it, and the documents your legal team will ask for.
An institution's legal and IT teams ask the same four questions before signing anything. This page answers them, and links to the documents rather than paraphrasing them.
Who is responsible for the recipient's data
Under India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, the two roles that matter are the Data Fiduciary — who decides what happens to personal data — and the Data Processor, who acts on the Fiduciary's instructions.
You are the Data Fiduciary for your recipients. We are your Data Processor.
That is not a formality, and it decides who does what:
| Obligation | Whose |
|---|---|
| A lawful basis for holding the recipient's data | Yours |
| The notice the Act requires, given to the recipient | Yours |
| Verifiable parental consent, if the recipient is under 18 | Yours — you hold the relationship, we cannot verify it |
| Deciding whether a credential is public or behind a private link | Yours |
| Keeping the data secure while we hold it | Ours |
| Not using it for anything except running the service | Ours |
| Telling you within 72 hours if it is breached | Ours |
| Reporting that breach to the Data Protection Board | Yours, with everything we have |
For your own staff accounts — the people who sign in to the dashboard — we are the Fiduciary, because we decide what an account needs in order to work.
What we do with it
Only what the service does: generate the credential, store it, deliver it to the recipient, serve the public check page, and count unique recipients for billing.
We do not use recipient data to train models, market to recipients, or sell anything to anyone. A recipient's email address is used to send them their credential and nothing else.
The documents
- Data Processing Addendum — the processor terms, published so you can read them before talking to us.
- Sub-processors — every third party that may touch personal data, what each does, and where it runs. Named, not described.
- Security — how separation between institutions is enforced, how signing keys work, and what we have not been audited against.
- Privacy Policy — including the grievance route and escalation to the Data Protection Board.
The one thing to decide before you issue, not after
Publishing a credential creates a permanent public record. That is the point of it — an employer can check it without trusting you or us. It also means deletion is not a clean operation: removing a published credential does not make the claim untrue, it makes it uncheckable, and it breaks every verifier holding the identifier.
So when a recipient exercises an erasure right, the normal remedy is to revoke the credential (the check page then says plainly that it is no longer valid) and redact the personal fields, while keeping the identifier resolvable. Hard deletion is available if you need it, and we will tell you the consequence in writing first.
Two related product behaviours worth knowing:
- Unpublished credentials do not resolve publicly at all. A credential in review answers exactly as a nonexistent one does, because saying "this exists but is in review" leaks that somebody is about to receive something.
- No account state invalidates an issued credential. Suspension, cancellation and non-payment stop you issuing; they never break the check page for what you have already published.
Minors
If you issue to school students, read section 7 of the DPA first. The Act requires verifiable parental consent and prohibits behavioural tracking and targeted advertising aimed at children. We do none of the latter to anyone — but the consent is yours to obtain, and the simplest protection is not to put data on a certificate that it does not need. A certificate needs a name, a programme and a date. It does not need a date of birth or an identity number, and once published, whatever is on it is public.
Still to come
We are a small company and will not imply otherwise:
- We hold no SOC 2 or ISO 27001 report.
- We have had no third-party penetration test. An internal security audit of the whole codebase was completed in November 2026 and every confirmed finding fixed; that is an internal exercise, not an external attestation.
- Our legal documents have not yet been reviewed by external counsel.
If any of those is a procurement requirement, tell us and we will say honestly where we are rather than where we would like to be.